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ESSAY
THE CASE AGAINST TRANSFERRING BLM
LANDS TO THE STATES
Michael C. Blumm*
T he Republican revolution's rush to deregulate environmental
resources-witnessed thus far by slashing agency budgets,'
restricting agency enforcement,2 and exempting developments from
environmental laws3 may soon include a serious effort to transfer
control over the 270 million acres of federal lands administered by
the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to the states. Two bills
in the 104th Congress, House Bill 2032" and Senate Bill 1031,'
would authorize states to demand the wholesale transfer of BLM
lands located within their boundaries. Both bills present an all-or-
nothing option: a state may choose to acquire all of the BLM lands
or none of them, but may not choose to acquire just a portion of
them.6
This effort to de-federalize the public lands is perhaps the result
of an adverse reaction within the ranching community and, to a
lesser extent, the timber and mining communities to the
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1. See GOP Budget Cuts Diluting Environmental Protection, Democrats Say,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 1996, at 9; Gary Lee, GOP Environmental Tactics Scored,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1996, at A17.
2. GOP Budget Cuts, supra note 1, at 9; Lee, supra note 1, at A17.
3. See William Neikirk, Empowerment Zones Hit a Wall, CHI. TRIB., July
27, 1995, at 1 (discussing exemptions from federal environmental laws to pro-
mote revitalization of inner cities).
4. H.R. 2032, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
5. S. 1031, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
6. H.R. 2032 § 1(c); S. 1031 § I(c).
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implementation of federal environmental laws.7 About 160 million
of the 270 million acres of BLM lands are currently subject to
grazing permits.' Grazing permitees have come to rely on their
grazing allotments as if they were their private property,9 even
though the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act0 expressly declared that a
grazing permit conveyed no property rights." As a result of this
reliance, graziers are particularly vulnerable to land-use changes
resulting from plans submitted in compliance with the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act,'2 the environmental evaluations
required by the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 and the
consultation process mandated by the Endangered Species Act.'4
Transfer of BLM lands to the states would be a convenient way to
eliminate these requirements and put an end to what some in the
ranching community have called the federal government's "war on
the West."' 5
The combatants in this new war, which include members of the
so-called "wise use" movement" and the "county supremacy"
7. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, In Battle Over Public Lands, Ranchers Push
Public Aside, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al.
8. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RE-
SOURCES LAW 688 (3d ed. 1991).
9. See Storm Over Rangelands, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at A22 (dis-
cussing the case of a Nevada rancher who claims that his federal grazing permit
confers a private property right based on nineteenth century state law).
10. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1988).
11. 43 U.S.C. § 315b. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973)
(federal government does not have to pay "permit value" when condemning pri-
vate ranch lands because grazing permit is not a compensable property interest).
12. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For plan requirements,
see id. § 1712.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). An environmental im-
pact statement must be prepared pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). See also 40
C.F.R. pt. 1502 (1995) (requiring preparation of environmental impact state-
ments); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1995) (stating when a federal agency should prepare
an environmental assessment).
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1998 & Supp. V 1993). Section 1536(a) requires
inter-agency consultation and cooperation.
15. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Campaigns Focus on 2 Views of West, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A29.
16. See Keith Schneider, Landowners Unite in Battle Against Regulators,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at Al. The "wise use" movement is funded in large
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movement, 17 are latter day "sagebrush rebels."' 8 These rebels
gained prominence in the late 1970s, when President Carter and his
Democratic administration newly implemented several federal
environmental laws. 9 Successor administrations made clear that
measure by mining companies. Id. For a general discussion of the "wise use"
movement, see Rene Erm II, The "Wise Use" Movement: The Constitutionality of
Local Action on Federal Lands Under the Preemption Doctrine, 30 IDAHO L.
REV. 631 (1993-1994).
17. The "county supremacy" movement has recently gained notoriety in the
dispute over Nye County ordinances which assert that the federal government
does not, in fact, own BLM administered lands. See Timothy Egan, Court Puts
Down Rebellion Over Control of Federal Land, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 1996, at
Al. A district court in Nevada has virtually eliminated all hopes of the "county
supremacy" movement to gain control of BLM lands absent congressional ap-
proval. United States v. Nye County, Nevada, No. CV-S-95-00232, slip op. (D.
Nev. March 14, 1996). Contrary to the position of the county supremacists, the
court ruled that "the United States owns and has the power and authority to man-
age and administer ... public lands ...." Id.
For an account of the Nye County controversy, see Erik Larson, Unrest in
the West; Welcome to Nevada's Nye County, Whose Angry Residents are Spear-
heading the Region's Charge Against Washington, TIME, Oct. 23, 1995, at 52.
See also Gary Poole, Hold It! This is My Land! Led By Commissioner Dick
Carver, Nevada's Nye County is Now Ground Zero in the West's War Against
the U.S. Government, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, Magazine, at 28.
18. Dave Abelson, Comment, Water Rights and Grazing Permits:
Transforming Public Lands Into Private Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 409
(1994); Theodore Blank, Grazing Rights on Public Lands: Wayne Hage Com-
plains of a Taking, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 603, 605 n.5 (1993-1994). But cf Harvey
M. Jacobs & Brian W. Ohm, Statutory Takings Legislation: The National Con-
cept, the Wisconsin and Minnesota Proposals, 2 WIs. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 183
(1995) (stating that wise users and county supremacists are not latter day sage-
brush rebels).
For a description of the "sagebrush rebellion," see Bruce Babbitt, Federal-
ism and Environmental Law: An Intergovernmental Perspective on the Sagebrush
Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848 (1982) (Mr. Babbitt is currently Secretary of
the Interior). The sagebrush rebellion unsuccessfully sought to turn federal lands
over to the states in the 1970s. Jon Christensen, As a Way of Life Vanishes, a
'Revitalization' Movement Arises in the West, BALT. SUN, May 3, 1995, at 19A.
19. See John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics,
and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
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they would assume an approach more favorable to existing
commodity users.2"
More than a decade later, the sagebrush rebels are back as "wise
users" or "county supremacists," and have apparently convinced
many legislators that the federal presence is costly to local
communities." This is in spite of the evidence that annual family
income in rural counties with public lands is about $2,000 higher
than in counties without public lands. This Essay suggests that
there are several reasons why Congress should reaffirm the role of
the federal government in public land management.
1. Non-Market Values
The BLM lands contain values which are not subject to accurate
market pricing. As of January 1995, there were some 622 wilder-'
ness study areas containing over 20 million acres on BLM lands.2
Moreover, as of 1992, BLM had designated 524 of these sites,
embracing more than 8.7 million acres, as "areas of critical envi-
ronmental concern."24 There is reason to believe that the natural,
historic, cultural, and "existence" values of these areas would be
sacrificed by states in the pursuit of market-oriented commodity
production.25
20. For a discussion of the Reagan Administration's policies, see Robin E.
Folsom, Comment, Executive Order 12,630: A President's Manipulation of the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause to Achieve Control Over Executive
Agency Regulatory Decisionmaking, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 639, 644-54
(1993).
21. See Abelson, supra note 18, at 409; Schneider, supra note 16, at Al.
22. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECON. RES. SERV., BULL. No.
710, UNDERSTANDING RURAL AMERICA (1995).
23. Telephone Interview with Rob Hellie, Wilderness Staff, Bureau of Land
Management, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 6, 1996).
24. Telephone Interview with Cheryl McCaffrey, State Office Botanist for
Bureau of Land Management in Oregon and Washington (Oct. 12, 1995).
25. See Melissa A. Heath, Note, A Tidelands Trust for Georgia, 17 GA. L.
REv. 851, 877 (1983) (discussing the case of a state court's approval of a lease
of nearly 25,000 acres of land for phosphate mining despite the implication of
non-market values); Valerie Richardson, On Western Range, BLM is Hated Fed-
eral Regulator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at Al.
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2. Access
One of the great advantages of federal ownership is that it affords
the public access to the lands for a variety of recreational activi-
ties." In 1994, the public made more than 65 million visits to
BLM lands for hunting, fishing, camping, and other leisure activi-
ties.27 Residents of Michigan and Massachusetts, for example,
have the same right of access to BLM lands located in Western
states as residents of those states.2' Devolution to the states could
threaten this access, effectively creating monopoly rights.
3. Scientific Expertise
The federal government possesses large advantages over individu-
al states in terms of its ability to marshall scientific expertise.29
The federal government, for example, has been collecting ecologi-
cal data throughout the upper Columbia Basin in an effort to ra-
tionalize federal land management east of the Cascades.3" This
effort, which the Republican Congress threatens to de-authorize,31
should be contrasted with state land management efforts, which are
characterized by a general lack of systematic, scientific planning.32
26. See To Transfer the Lands Administered by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment to the State in Which the Lands Are Located: Hearings on H.R. 2032 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks, Forests and Lands, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Bonnie R. Cohen, Assistant Secre-
tary-Policy, Management and Budget, U.S. Department of the Interior) (stating
that H.R. 2032 would limit access to public lands for recreational visits), avail-
able in WESTLAW, US TESTIMONY Database, Aug. 1, 1995.
27. BLM Report Cites Rewards From Public Lands, PR NEWSWIRE, July 31,
1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
28. Hearings, supra note 26.
29. See Gary D. Meyers, Old-Growth Forests, the Owl, and Yew: Environ-
mental Ethics Versus Traditional Dispute Resolution Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act and Other Public Lands and Resources Laws, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 623 (1991) (reviewing the ecological and other scientific bases for listing
the owl as an endangered species).
30. See also Scott Sonner, Columbia Basin Environmental Study Vital to
Wildlife, Forest Chief Says, OREGONIAN, Feb. 18, 1996, at D2.
31. See H.R. 1977, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 314 (1995).
32. Mark Borkowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power,
22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 697, 726 (1995).
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Most Western states have yet to complete an inventory of the pub-
lic lands within their borders.33
4. Limited Jurisdiction
There is an inherent incongruity between state boundaries and the
dimensions of watersheds and biodiversity concerns.3 4 Political
boundaries have seldom been drawn to reflect ecological reali-
ties.35 In fact, political boundaries are typically drawn at the mid-
dle of a waterbody, effectively bisecting a watershed.36 State con-
trol of public lands would ensure fragmented management, making
a large part of ecosystem management extrajurisdictional, or "exter-
nal," to the state.37
5. Public Choice Theory
Limited boundaries are not the only reason why state control of
public lands would increase environmental costs. Federal control of
public lands has been justifiably criticized for allowing well-orga-
nized commodity users-ranchers, miners, timber companies-to
dominate public land decision making.38 Public choice political
theory predicts that small, well-organized groups will capture deci-
sion making, allowing these groups to capture "economic rents" and
pass the costs on to the unorganized, but more numerous public.39
While this "capture by the organized" describes much federal land
decision making, it would reign without restraint if the individual
33. Melinda Bruce & Teresa Rice, Controlling the Blue Rash: Issues and
Trends in State Land Management, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 35 (1994).
34. See Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the
Challenges Ahead, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 911, 920-22 (1994).
35. See Columnist Cries Wolf on Predators in Yellowstone Park, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1992; Roger K. Lewis, Shaping the City, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
1990.
36. Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25
ENVTL. L. 973, 992 (1995).
37. Id.
38. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why
Multiple Use Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 405 (1994).
39. Id. at 415-22. For a definition of "economic rents," see Linz Audain, The
Economics of Law Related Labor V: Judicial Careers, Judicial Selection, and an
Agency Cost Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 115, 146 (1992).
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states were the decision makers.' The current management of
state-owned lands may foreshadow state management of BLM
lands. A recent study found a "numbing sameness" in state land-
management techniques, characterized by a general failure to obtain
fair market value for the use of the land, persistent underfunding of
management, and high environmental costs.41
Current state land management in Oregon, viewed by many to be
a progressive state,42 is instructive. The Oregon Land Board re-
cently rescinded a policy that had allowed the leasing of state
rangelands to the highest bidder.43 The Board replaced that policy
with a more restrictive one, limiting participation in the program to
ranchers only, despite the prospect of reduced revenues for the state
school fund." Further, implementation of the State's Forest Prac-
tices Act4 5-under which the State has approved the liquidation of
nearly all ancient forests on non-federal land"--will now be con-
strained by a 1996 amendment.47 This amendment limits environ-
mental protection to measures that do not result in more than a ten
percent reduction in the volume or value of timber harvests.'
James Madison warned, two centuries ago, that "special interests"
exerted a greater influence at the state than the federal level.4 9 His
insight has certainly proved to be true in the field of land manage-
ment.
40. See Blumm, supra note 38, at 417-18 (describing how "political activity
would be dominated by small special interest groups engaging in rent-seeking at
the expense of the public").
41. Bruce & Rice, supra note 32, at 22-26.
42. Forestry Data Network Due, OREGONIAN, May 5, 1993, at Cl.
43. Land Board Rejects Selling Large Areas of State Rangeland, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 13, 1995, at D13.
44. OR. ADMIN. R. 141-110.010 to 141-110.170 (1995); see also Kathleen
Kreller, State Land Board Dumps Policy Requiring Bids for Grazing Land, ORE-
GONIAN, June 14, 1995, at B4.
45. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 527.610 to 527.770 (1995).
46. OR. REV. STAT. § 527.707.
47. OR. H.B. 3485, 68th Leg., Special Sess. § 17(2)(a) (1996).
48. Id.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
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6. Public Participation
One unavoidable result of transferring BLM lands to the states
will be the loss of public participatory rights."0 Virtually no state
makes citizen access to administrative and judicial appeals as readi-
ly available as does the federal government." Reduced opportuni-
ties to appeal will inevitably lead to reduced opportunities for
meaningful participation in the administrative process.
7. Nationhood
Life in America in the twentieth century is characterized by
strong centrifugal forces. As Congress "de-federalizes" entitlement
programs52 and slashes the federal role in a host of social ser-
vice53 and regulatory programs, 4 very little remains that binds us
together as a nation. We vote in only one national election and,
even then, actually vote just for state presidential electors; through
the 14th Amendment," we enjoy the protections of the Bill of
Rights against state government actions;56 and we all own a share
of the federal lands. The federal lands are important symbols of our
nationhood, and we should be extremely reluctant to deprive our
children and future generations of their inheritance. The economic,
environmental, and psychic costs will not only be substantial, they
will be irreversible.
50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1739(e) (requiring public participation in planning and
managing public lands). For a definition of "public participation rights," see Da-
vid J. Abell, Exercise of Constitutional Privileges: Determining Abuse of the
First Amendment-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 47 SMU L.
REv. 95, 101 (1993).
51. For a discussion of the breadth of federal appeal procedures, see 1
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW §§ 7-8 (1995).
52. See, e.g., Lawmakers Pushing Hard For a Softer Bill; Welfare Bill Goes
After Deadbeat Parents, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 24, 1995, at Al.
53. See, e.g., id.
54. See, e.g., Gary Lee, Compromising on Clean Air Act; Under Republican
Pressure, EPA Reduces Enforcement Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1996, at Al.
55. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
56. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience,
72 B.U. L. REv. 747, 753 (1992).
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More than a hundred years ago, a similar proposal to de-federal-
ize Indian reservations was enacted by a reform-minded Con-
gress.57 The reformers claimed that dismantling the traditions of
communal land ownership would transform the Natives into pro-
ductive agrarians.58 Unfortunately, the chief result of the Dawes
Act of 1887 was a loss of nearly two-thirds of the Indian land base
to the white settlers and a steady decline in the quality of the native
standard of living.59 The fragmentation of ownership created by
the Dawes Act has turned the management of reservation lands into
a jurisdictional nightmare.' That Act's reforms proved disastrous
to their intended beneficiaries.6 Regrettably, recognition of the
failures of the Dawes Act did not mean that its effects could be
reversed.
I submit that congressional de-federalization of the BLM lands
will result in the destruction of wilderness, the loss of public ac-
cess, a decline in science-based management, fragmented jurisdic-
tion, increased environmental costs, a reduction in public participa-
tion, and an irretrievable loss of national heritage lands. The costs
of losing some 270 million acres of the national estate-fully three
times the amount of land de-federalized by the Dawes Act-will be
paid not just by this or the next generation but also by generations
yet unborn. These are the costs that the 104th Congress and its
successors should be unwilling to pay.
57. That proposal was contained in the Dawes Act of 1887, 23 U.S.C. § 331
(1988). See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 152 (3d ed. 1991).
58. George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 467, 484 (1994).
59. L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compro-
mising Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 53, 53 (1994).
60. See Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
61. John F. Walsh, Note, Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 38
STAN. L. REv. 227, 230 (1985) (stating that the loss of the Indian land base
caused by Dawes Act was "a crushing blow both to the economic hopes and to
the cultural morale of the Indian people").
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